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A Blurred Distinction: United States v. Turner and Distinguishing Between True Threats and
Incitement of Imminent Unlawful Conduct
Author: Christopher Capitanelli1
Introduction
True threats and incitement are distinct but closely related categories of punishable
speech. Although these classifications began from distinct doctrines, the line between them has
blurred considerably over time. Often, when courts are confronted with menacing speech, they
are able to classify the speech as either a threat or advocacy, and then apply the appropriate
analysis. For example, a man who threatens to punch or kill another person face to face may be
convicted for making a “true threat.” On the other hand, a political activist who sends out mass
messages and causes riots or violence may be convicted of “incitement to imminent violence.”
Speech, however, is rarely so black and white that it fits neatly into one category. Courts,
understandably, often struggle with cases that present speech containing elements of both threats
and advocacy of unlawful conduct. While the line between the two forms of speech may be
difficult to draw sometimes, before we determine whether speech is punishable as a true threat or
advocacy of unlawful conduct, we must determine whether the speech should be categorized as a
threat or advocacy. Only then can we determine whether the speech is protected or unprotected
under the appropriate test.
United States v. Turner, a case out of the Second Circuit, epitomizes this problem.2 Hal
Turner, a shock jock DJ from Chicago, Illinois, was arrested and convicted for threatening a

1 Submissions Editor, Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 46. J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law,
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2 See United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 413, 414 (2d Cir. 2013).
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federal judge in a blog posted to his website.3 Following a decision by the Seventh Circuit,4
Turner posted a blog to his website calling for the deaths of the judges involved in the decision. 5
Though the speech in question was certainly despicable and vituperative in nature, upon
examination it was not so obvious that these comments were a threat rather than advocacy of
unlawful conduct.6 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit chose to analyze Turner’s speech strictly
under a “true threats” analysis from the start, leading to an affirmation of his conviction. 7
By ignoring the complex nature of the speech and presupposing it is a threat by applying
a “true threats” analysis, the court potentially undermined the distinction between “true threats”
and “advocacy of unlawful conduct.” In response, this Comment will create a test to help
remediate this issue, using an analysis of principles established in case law, as well as a
recognition of challenging factual scenarios and doctrinal justifications. This test will prove
useful in appropriately classifying and analyzing ambiguous speech that toes the line between
threats and advocacy. As a result, the line between “true threats” and advocacy of unlawful
conduct will be clarified, while ensuring that a proper level of Constitutional protection is
afforded to speakers.
In Part I, I will define true threats and advocacy of unlawful conduct through an
examination of the cases that sprung their distinct analyses, and identify the modern versions of
these tests. In Part II I will examine several cases, including U.S v. Turner, that represent
instances where courts confronted ambiguous speech, and examine how they approached the
issue of categorizing said speech. I will also identify factual scenarios present in these cases that
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Id.
Turner’s comments were in reaction to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that the Second Amendment was not applicable
to the States. See National Rifle Association of America v. Chicago, 567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub
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present a more challenging endeavor to courts attempting to appropriately classify and analyze
speech. In Part III I will identify several relevant factors used by courts in distinguishing
between threats and advocacy through case law. In Part IV, in light of the doctrinal beginnings,
relevant case law principles, and complicating factual scenarios set forth in the preceding
sections, I will outline a three part test that courts will be able to use to more effectively
distinguish between threats and advocacy. I will then apply this test to U.S. v. Turner. Part V is
my conclusion.
I. Defining “True Threats” and “Incitement”
Over the past 100 years, the Supreme Court has addressed the question of what speech may
be proscribed by law countless times.8 Nevertheless, the individual tests used by courts to analyze
true threats and incitement are still developing areas of law. What we do know at this point is that
there are two guideposts for any threatening-speech analysis: 1) true threats are unprotected under
the Constitution, and 2) advocacy of force or law violation that is intended to and likely to produce
imminent unlawful activity is likewise unprotected under the Constitution. 9 This section will flesh
out these two doctrines and provide several justifications for the separation of the two.
a. Watts and True Threats
In U.S. v. Watts, a Vietnam War protester was arrested during a public demonstration on
the grounds of the Washington Monument for stating: “They always holler at us to get an
education. And now I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report
for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.”10

8

See Scott Hammock, Article, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a Modification of
the Courts' Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 Colum. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 65, 68 (2002).
9 See id.
10 Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399 (1969).
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On the basis of this statement by the defendant, he was convicted of "knowingly and
willfully threatening the President," thereby violating federal law. 11 In a brief per curiam opinion,
the Supreme Court overturned Watts’ conviction.12 Although the nation has a strong interest in
protecting the President, a statute such as this one, which criminalizes speech, must be interpreted
within the command of the First Amendment. 13 The Court recognized that a true threat is not
protected under the Constitution and must be distinguished from its constitutionally protected
progeny.14

It concluded that Watts’ speech did not constitute a true threat, but rather politica l
The language of the political arena “is often

hyperbole protected under the Constitution. 15

vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”16 Thus, the language used by Watts, although a “very crude
offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President,” was a protected form of speech
under the Constitution.17
Although the Supreme Court established that true threats were not Constitutiona lly
protected under Watts, the exact method for analyzing such speech was left unanswered. 18 As
such, the lower courts developed various tests for determining whether speech constituted a true
threat as opposed to protected speech.

The majority of circuits have adopted an objective

approach, where a true threat will be found if “an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar
with the context…would [interpret] the statement as a threat of injury.” 19
However, this has not stopped other courts from constructing their own adaptations of the
reasonable recipient test. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, the First

11

Id.
Id.
13 See id. at 707.
14 See id.
15 Id.
16 Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
17 Id.
18 See Hammock, supra note 1 at 78.
19 See id.
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and Ninth Circuits adopted a speaker-based objective approach, examining whether it is
“reasonably foreseeable…to a speaker that the listener will seriously take his communication as
an intent to commit serious bodily harm.”20
The Second Circuit in U.S. v. Kelner created the narrowest interpretation of a true threat. 21
In Kelner, the appellant, a member of the Jewish Defense League, was convicted of “causing to be
transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of
another.”22 Here, the threat was made against Yassar Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Leadership
Organization.23 During a radio broadcast, the appellant stated that, “[w]e have people who have
been trained and who are out now and who intend to make sure that Mr. Arafat and his lieutena nts
do not leave this country alive….We are planning to assassinate Mr. Arafat….Everything is
planned in detail.”24 Although the speech at issue was publicly proclaimed, the court held that the
speech in question constituted an unprotected true threat. 25 The speech, “on its face and in the
circumstances in which it was made,” was so “unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific” to the person threatened that it conveys a “gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution.”26

This test constitutes a much narrower version of the test adopted by the other

circuits, making it more difficult to proscribe speech, as it must be an “unambiguous threat.”27
b. Brandenburg and Incitement
In the months following Watts, the Supreme Court revisited threatening speech once again.
The Court reversed the conviction of the appellant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, for making hateful

20

See id. (internal citation omitted).
See id.
22 United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976)
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1021.
25 Id. at 1027.
26 Id.
27 See United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 433 (2d Cir. 2013) (Pooler, J. dissenting).
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comments about blacks and Jews.28 The appellant stated, among other things, that"[t]he Klan has
more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organization. We're not a revengent
organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken."29 He
also stated that he believes that “the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to
Israel."30
The appellant was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute that made it a
crime to "advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety of violence as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform."31 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and
set forth what remains the test to determine whether a person can be arrested for political advocacy
that causes or may cause illegal activity. 32 In recognition of the Constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press, a State may not “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent unlawful
conduct and is likely to incite or produce such action.”33 The “mere abstract teaching…of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force or violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”34 Measured by this standard,
the statute in question purported to punish mere advocacy and thus fell outside the bounds of
constitutional protection.35
c. Doctrinal Differences

28

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 89 S.Ct. 1827 (1969)
Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 444.
32 See id. at 447-49.
33 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
34 Id. at 448.
35 Id. at 449.
29
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In sum, we know there are two categories of unprotected speech: true threats and
incitement, under which we distinguish true threats from protected political speech, and incite me nt
from protected advocacy of violence. 36 Courts rightfully treat these doctrines as distinct from one
another.
The primary conceptual distinctions between true threats and incitement derive from the
harm the speech conveys and the way that it gets to the listener. 37 Incitement creates a risk that
third parties, as opposed to the speaker, will injure the listener. 38 True threats, on the other hand,
create apprehension that the violence will come from the speaker themselves, thus engendering a
more direct fear in the listener.39 As such, the two doctrines offer differing Constitutional levels
of protection. As mentioned previously, the majority of circuits employ a true threats analysis that
examines whether a reasonable person would, under the circumstances as given, consider the
speech a threat of injury. On the other hand, the Brandenburg analysis demands evidence not only
that there was advocacy of violence, but also that it presented an imminent threat to the listener.
This standard allots a greater degree of protection to the speaker as opposed to a true threat
analysis, which is less speech protective and more ambiguous.
There are a number of purported justifications for keeping these doctrines distinct. First is
the purpose of the speech.40 For the inciter, the goal is to promote or prompt unlawful action to be
undertaken by third parties not under the control of the speaker. 41 The speaker is seeking to
motivate and mobilize these third parties with some semblance of immediacy or imminence. 42

36

See Turner, 720 F.3d at 430 (Pooler, J. dissenting).
See First Amendment - Freedom of Speech - Second Circuit Affirms Threats Conviction in Internet Speech Case,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2585, 2589 (2014)
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First Amendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 541, 565
(2004).
41 See id.
42 See id.
37
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These third parties are the means by which the speaker can achieve his goal. 43 Without these third
parties, the speaker will not be successful in achieving a violation of the law. 44
The purpose of the threat maker is to force the listener to act.45 Generally, the threat-maker
wants the listener to perform a non-volitional act, or to not perform a volitional act. 46 The threatmaker accomplishes this by two means: by delivering the message to the target, and by instilling
fear in said target.47 Actual harm is not the goal of the threat-maker.48 By communicating the
message to the target and instilling fear or apprehension of serious harm in the target, the threatmaker uses threatened harm as a means to accomplish an end: to force the victim to perform a nonvolitional function.49 To this end, threats can be viewed as a way “of doing things, not saying
things.”50 Furthermore, the threat-maker does not concern himself with third parties because they
cannot achieve his goal – it is the target’s actions which the threat-maker seeks to control.51 In
furtherance of this goal, the threat-maker seeks out or identifies the target.
Second is the location of the communication. The inciter is often in a public setting and
speaking extemporaneously, while implicating First Amendment values of free speech and public
discourse. 52

The public address is infamous for predominantly charged rhetoric concerning

matters of public interest, which lies at the base of our First Amendment values.53 Public speech
seeks to move those of like opinion and to encourage others to take up their cause. In order to

43

See id. at 568.
See id.
45 Id.
46 See Elrod, supra note 39 at 568.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See Thomas Healy, BRANDENBURG IN A TIME OF TERROR, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 655, 669 (2009).
51 See Elrod, supra note 39 at 568.
52 Id. at 566.
53 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002) (Kozinski, J. dissenting) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted).
44
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honor this privilege, we as citizens must be privy to the realization that “[s]trong and effective
extemporaneous rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases,” and may even
retain overtones of menace at times. 54 On the contrary, threats are often privately communicated
directly to their target.55 Threats have a specific target in mind; they are spoken as a means to an
end, and must at some point be communicated to the target, whether that happens directly or
indirectly.56
Finally, persuasion presents an additional justification. Professor Strauss of University of
Chicago Law School posited that the First Amendment should be more protective of speech that
endears to the will of a person.57 The violation of law that attaches to the suppression of speech
may only hold up in the face of speech that bypasses the rational process of deliberations. 58 If
people are “truly persuaded” to violate the law, then the government should not punish the speaker
for such speech, for it appeals to the reason of the listener, and it is their decision whether or not
to act on such speech, not the speaker’s.59 Thus, advocacy, which seeks to persuade third parties
to violate the law, commands greater protection under the First Amendment as opposed to threats.
II. A Common Problem
Having explained the origins of the twin doctrines, I believe the best way to shed light on
the issue this Comment tackles is through examples.

The following three cases, though

preeminently authored, highlight the difficulties involved with categorizing speech before a proper
analysis regarding the level of protection afforded to it can commence. In Part IV(b) I will reexamine U.S. v. Turner in lieu of the test I craft in Part IV(a).

54

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 3434 (1982)
See Elrod, supra note 39 at 567.
56 Id.
57 See PERSUASION, AUTONOMY, AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION , 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334, 338 (1991).
58 See id.
59 See id.
55
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a. NAACP v. Claiborne
In 1966, a local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
Persons (NAACP) organized a boycott of white merchants. 60

The boycott sought to acquire

equality and racial justice through the compliance of civic and business leaders. 61 The boycott
was largely supported by speeches encouraging community members to join the boycott through
nonviolent picketing, but violent demonstrations did occur. 62
Following the death of a boycotter at the hands of police, Charles Evers, the field organizer
of the NAACP for the state of Mississippi and a political organizer of the boycotts, led several
rallies in condemnation of the police’s actions, calling for a tighter boycott.63 During one speech,
Evers proclaimed that people who shopped at the boycotted stores "would be 'disciplined' by their
own people and warned that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night."64 During
a different speech, Evers also said, "If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're
gonna break your damn neck."65 Although the speech by Evers was not accompanied by violence,
there were several incidents of violence during the boycott years that revealed a possible
“atmosphere of fear” surrounding boycott violators. 66 The majority of these violent incidents
involved damage to the violators’ houses from gunfire and other objects.67
Seventeen white merchants filed suit against the NAACP and a host of other defendants
involved in the boycotts, seeking damages for lost profits caused by the defendants over the fouryear span of the boycotts.68 The Mississippi Supreme Court imposed liability on the defendants

60

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 898(1982)
Id. at 892.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 893.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 893 – 4.
67 See id.
68 Id. at 886.
61
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for damages “resulting from the boycott” on the ground that the defendants had agreed to use
“force, violence, and threats to effectuate the boycott.”69
On cert, the United States Supreme Court held that the speech by the NAACP leader could
not give rise to liability.70 Evers’ speech could only be proscribed if it was deemed to be an
advocacy of force or law violation that was directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.71 Although some acts of violence occurred
during the boycott and the speech was "emotionally charged," the "rhetoric . . . did not transcend
the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg."72 An advocate must be free to stimula te
his audience with emotional appeals for unity towards a common cause. 73 When such actions do
not incite unlawful activity, they must be regarded as protected speech. 74 “To rule otherwise would
ignore the ‘profound national commitment’ that ‘debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’”75
This case presented an interesting scenario for the Court to analyze, and some lasting
results as well. From the outset, the Court analyzed this case under a Brandenburg analysis. The
court showed great deference to the political nature of Evers’ speech in its analysis. The public
forum used by Evers also lent heavily to the Court’s choice of a Brandenburg analysis.
However, an examination into the speech itself reveals a more difficult analysis. Regarding
individuals whom Evers had known were involved in dealings with white suppliers, Evers stated
that, “If we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn
neck.” The language itself carried an explicit threat – there was no prediction apparent in the

69

Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 909.
71 Id. at 911.
72 Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 911.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
70
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message, nor was this a call to others to take action. Evers referred to him and his organiza tio n
members as “we” and threatened to break the necks of specific individuals, who, although not
directly named, were specifically referred to in the speech. Setting aside the public nature of the
forum, this language could very well be characterized as “threatening” as opposed to advocacy.
b. Planned Parenthood
Four doctors and two health clinics brought suit under the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994 (“FACE”) against the American Coalition of Life Activists (“ACLA”),
claiming they were the targets of threats by the ACLA.76 There were two purported threats at
issue: the so called “Deadly Dozen” posters with the word “Guilty” emblazoned across the front
in large, red font; and the “Nuremberg Files,” a website maintained by the ACLA containing filings
of all known practitioners providing abortions, in the event these individuals would one day be put
on trial for crimes against humanity. 77
The “Guilty” posters followed in the wake of several murders which had occurred
following the circulation of several posters containing the photograph and names of physicia ns,
their ties to legal abortion procedures in the state, their place of employment, and the tagline of
either “WANTED” or “unWANTED” for the “charges” of “crimes against humanity.” 78

The

doctors who were the subject of these posters interpreted the posters and website as a sign that
their lives were at risk.79 As one doctor commented, “that the posters…were followed by the
doctor’s assassination, emphasized for me the danger posed by this document, the Deadly Dozen

76

Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2002).
77 Id.
78 See id. at 1063–65.
79 Id. at 1065.
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List, which meant to me that – that, as night follows day, that my name was on this wanted poster…
and that I would be assassinated, as had the other doctors been assassinated.”80
The district court ruled that although the posters were not a threat on their face, in
consideration of the context of the situation a reasonable person could “foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of intent to harm.”81

A panel of the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter “Panel Opinion”)

reversed on appeal.82 The Panel Opinion stated that due to the ambiguous nature of the speech,
the public nature of the communication was determinative that the speech was political hyperbole
protected by the First Amendment.83
In response to the controversial nature of the case, the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter “Full
Court”) reviewed the Panel Opinion en banc, and reversed the decision.84 The Full Court looked
to Watts, Brandenburg, and Claiborne Hardware for guidance, noting that “[i]f ACLA had merely
endorsed or encouraged the violent actions of others, its speech would be protected.”85 However,
while advocacy of force is protected, “threatening a person with violence” is not. 86 The Full Court
reviewed the record and found that the use of the posters and the Nuremberg Files constituted a
true threat. 87

Taking context into account, three physicians had been murdered upon the

circulation of a similar poster.88 As such, the plaintiff physicians interpreted the circulation of
posters identifying them as threats on their life. 89 In conjunction with the “Guilty” posters, being

80

Id.
Id. at 1066.
82 Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1019–20 (9th
Cir. 2001).
83 Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1019.
84 Id. at 1063.
85 Id. at 1071–72.
86 Id. at 1072.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1079.
89 Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1079-80.
81
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listed “on a Nuremberg Files scorecard for abortion providers impliedly threatened physicians with
being next on a hit list.”90
This case presented a factual scenario that confounded the court as to whether the speech
should be classified and analyzed as either a true threat or incitement. The court in this case was
presented with speech presented through a public medium – the Internet. The majority goes to
great lengths to use the context in which the speech occurred to turn seemingly non-threatening
speech into threatening speech. Examining the speech in question, it would appear that the
“Guilty” posters and Nuremberg Files were not direct threats made by the makers of the posters
and database against these doctors. Instead, the speech appears to create a risk of harm to these
doctors by putting them in the spotlight, severely criticizing them, and providing information that
enhanced the likelihood that a reader - someone other than the speaker - would be able to identify,
locate, and harm them.91 This would seem to be more indicative of advocacy for harm to befall
the doctors, as opposed to a threat to harm them.
c. U.S. v. Turner
On June 2, 2009, Hal Turner published a blog post to his website, halturnershow.co m,
entitled, “OUTRAGE: Chicage Gun Ban UPHELD; Court says ‘Heller’ ruling by Supreme Court
not applicable to states or municipalities!”92 This blog post vehemently condemned the decision
of Judges Posner, Easterbrook, and Bauer that very same day. 93 In his post, Turner admonished
the Judges for their decisions, stating that “[g]overnment lies, cheats, manipulates, twists and
outright disobeys the supreme law and founding documents of this land because they have not, in

90

Id. at 1080.

91 See Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion? The Brandenburg Test And Speech That Encourages Or Facilitates Criminal
Acts, 38 W ILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 48, 59–60
92
93

Turner, 720 F.3d at 413.
See id.
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our lifetime, faced REAL free men willing to walk up to them and kill them for their defiance and
disobedience.”94

Turner also stated that the Judges “deserve to be killed.

Their blood will

replenish the tree of liberty.”95
Turner then referred to the infamous murder of Judge Joan Lefkow’s husband and
mother.96 Following her role in a court case involving the “World Church of the Creator,” Judge
Lefkow was targeted by the leader of the WCC, Matthew Hale, who would later be convicted of
the solicitation of the aforementioned murders. 97 In his reference, Turner described the crime and
stated, “[i]t appears that another lesson is needed,” and that his statements should be taken
seriously because there are “[p]eople with nothing to lose by hunting you down and murdering
you....”98 And while he “would never use this blog for such an endeavor,” his “eight years on the
radio and on the internet ha[d] gotten [him] in touch with enough of the right people to get it
done. 99 [He knew] how to get it done. 100 Federal District Judge Joan Humphrey Lefkow in
Chicago is proof.”101 Turner would then post photos of the judges as well as their work addresses,
alongside information on the location of bomb barriers protecting the courthouse.102
Turner was indicted on July 22, 2009, for “threatening to assault and murder three United
States judges with the intent to impede, intimidate, and interfere with such judges while engaged
in the performance of official duties and with intent to retaliate against such judges on account of
the performance of official duties,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). 103 A jury convicted

94

Id. at 415.
Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Turner, 720 F.3d at 415.
99 Id. at 417.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 416.
103 Id. at 417.
95
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him under the instruction that, “a statement is a threat if it was made under such circumstances that
a reasonable person hearing or reading the statement and familiar with its context would
understand it as a serious expression of an intent to inflict injury….”

104

Turner appealed his conviction to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed his
conviction as an unprotected true threat.105 Viewed in the context of his statements, the court
believed that Turner’s speech constituted more than political hyperbole or common politica l
discourse: these were references to actual acts of violence that constituted true threats.106
The majority further rejected an attempt by Turner to categorize his speech as unprotected
incitement because it was not an explicit threat and was directed at third parties (which, although
unprotected, would have been acceptable under a “threat” statute). 107

The Court found

unpersuasive that he did not explicitly threaten the judges, nor that his speech was directed at third
parties, and would not get hung up on “syntax,” instead stating that you do not need to have the
“grammatical precision of an Oxford don.”108
U.S. v. Turner presented a unique and challenging situation for the Second Circuit. The
first issue arose from the speech in question itself. The dissent, penned by Judge Pooler, brought
forth the very issue this Comment addresses: the fallacy in presupposing the classification of
speech. Before any analysis by the majority had taken place, the speech should have been
classified to insure that the proper level of Constitutional protection was being afforded to the
defendant.109 Judge Pooler was correct in stating that it should not be presupposed that the speech
at issue was a true threat and not possible protected advocacy.110 Mr. Turner’s speech did not

104

Turner, 720 F.3d at 418.
See id. at 429.
106 See id. at 421-23.
107 Id. at 422.
108 Id.
109 Turner, 720 F.3d at 430-31 (Pooler, J. dissenting).
110 Id.
105
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present an obvious case for the court to analyze; his speech was vague, inexplicit, and careful. 111
Nonetheless, the speech in question does not, at any point, indicate a threat made by Turner against
the judges, nor could it readily be characterized as such. Rather, Turner calls for the deaths of or
violence towards the judges, and even expressly rejects any hand he would have in such acts. The
majority, similar to Planned Parenthood, relies heavily on the introduction of context into the
analysis, and puts more weight on the reaction of the listeners than it does on Turner’s actual
speech.
The second issue Turner confronted was ambiguous speech communicated through a
unique and challenging medium – the Internet. The Internet, as a public medium, has introduced a
wealth of new issues in the legal world since its inception in the mainstream world over a decade
ago. As opposed to giving a speech in a public forum with a large, but limited audience, the
Internet broadcasts a message to thousands, if not millions, thus increasing the risk of action. The
majority and dissent took opposing views on the public nature of Turner’s speech. In stark contrast
to Claiborne, the majority stated that the public nature of the speech “does not make it any less
threatening.” On the contrary, the dissent believed the public nature of the speech to be a deciding
factor in its decision to analyze the speech under Brandenburg, stating that unless the speech in
question is clearly a threat, deference should be given to the public nature of the speech.
III. Drawing a Line
To this point, this Comment has identified the roots of these two doctrines, and provided
the proffered justifications for why these doctrines enjoy different levels of protection. Many
courts, however, have had trouble distinguishing threatening speech from advocacy/inciteme nt.
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Instead, many courts presuppose that speech should be characterized under a certain analysis. 112
While “the line may be difficult to draw at times,”113 and there is no distinct analysis that courts
engage in, there are principles spread throughout the case law that provide guide posts. This
section will lay out the existing general framework – including the areas where courts are divided
in their analyses – that courts use to classify speech before engaging in a true threats or incite me nt
analysis.
As mentioned earlier, true threats and incitement are formed by different actions and elicit
different reactions from their victims. True threats cause the victim to be fearful that violence will
come from the speaker.114 This fear can be as a result of the nature of the speech itself, or by an
implied causal connection.115
However, it is not enough to establish that the intended target is put in fear by the speech
at issue. The speaker must put the victim in fear that the violence will come from them.116 In this
sense, the speaker controls the violence;117 it will come from them or someone on their behalf or
associated with them.118 On the other hand, incitement consists of predictions or exhortations to
others.119 In sum, the speech directed towards the object constitutes a threat, whereas speech
communicated to third parties constitutes incitement.

See Turner, 720 F.3d at 431 (Pooler, J. dissenting) (“Application of the "true threats" test presupposes that the
speech at issue is a purported threat and only evaluates its seriousness.”) (citing Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343, 358
(2003)).
113 United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1983).
114 See Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1058.
115 See, e.g., Turner, 720 F.3d at 422.
116 See Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d at 1058.
117 See id.
118 See id; see also New York v. Operation Rescue Nat'l, 273 F.3d 184, 196 (2d Cir. 2001); Turner 720 F.3d at 432
(Pooler, J. dissenting).
119 See United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2011).
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This leads to the syntax of the speech.120 For example, the phrase “I will kill you,” in the
active voice, appears to insinuate that the harm will come from the speaker. 121 On the other hand,
“You deserve to die,” in the passive voice, is ambiguous as to who will do the “killing.”122 To that
effect, the speech is more properly characterized as a prediction or exhortation, commanding a
Brandenburg analysis.123 However, courts are not necessarily convinced that syntax should be a
relevant concern when classifying speech.124 Many courts remain committed to the notion that
"[r]igid adherence to the literal meaning of a communication without regard to its reasonable
connotations derived from its ambience would render the statute powerless against the ingenuity
of threateners who can instill in the victim's mind as clear an apprehension of impending injury by
an implied menace as by a literal threat.”125
What is relevant to courts when classifying speech is the distinction between public speech
and private/private communications. In most cases of a showing of a true threat the speech was
targeted at specific individuals or communicated directly to the victim. 126 If threatening speech is
communicated in a public setting, this “bears heavily” on whether the speech may be interpreted
as a threat or not.127 On the other hand, instances of threatening speech communicated directly to
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cases.”)
125 United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1994).
126 See Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., id. (letter containing a threat was addressed and
mailed to federal judge); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding a true threat where
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127 See Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 244 F.3d at 1018 (because the speech was facially ambiguous, the public nature
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the target are much more likely to be true threats, instead of speech communicated as part of a
public protest.

128

The reason for this distinction is that private speech – face-to-face

communication, a letter, an email, etc. – is aimed only at its target. 129 This point is further
established by the fact that an ambiguous threat privately delivered to the target has been primarily
categorized and successfully analyzed as a true threat by many courts. 130 Public speech, in
contrast, seeks to move public opinion and recruit those of like mind. 131 Therefore, coercive
speech that is part of the public discourse enjoys far more protection than the same speech privately
communicated.132
However, not all public speech is analyzed under the Brandenburg analysis. Claiborne
proposes strong deference to public speech. However, in this day and age we are presented with
such intriguing mediums as the Internet, which present a different scenario than a public rally.
There is a general discrepancy as to how to categorize and subsequently analyze these situatio ns.
As evidenced by the majority in Turner, some courts will ignore the public nature of the speech
when they are of the belief that the speech rises to such a level of menace that it cannot be
diminished by the fact that it was communicated as part of a public protest. 133 To the contrary is
the dissent in Turner, which states that there should be great deference to the public setting or
medium, relying on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Claiborne.134 The Turner dissent claims that
when speech is unambiguously directed at a target, the distinction between private or public
communication is irrelevant.135 However, a public statement must be clearly in the form of a threat
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in order for it to be analyzed as a true threat as opposed to under Brandenburg. 136 To this extent
you are walking a thin line – you want to protect the ability of citizens to advocate through public
forums and mediums; however, you also do not want to allow a loophole for people to stand on a
soapbox and threaten others without fear of liability for their words.
IV. Adjusting the Line
The question remains whether or not this line is sufficient to distinguish threatening speech
from purported advocacy. This Comment answers that question, “kind of.” There are two main
issues with how the case law distinguishes threats from advocacy. First, many courts do not engage
in this examination. Many “presuppose” the speech to be analyzed as a “true threat” or inciteme nt,
and rather than properly analyze whether the speech should be subject to a true threats or
Brandenburg analysis, the speech is subject to a true threats test. 137 If the true threats analysis
fails, it is often then analyzed under Brandenburg.138 This is a mistake – these twin doctrines apply
to two different types of speech, and should be analyzed under the proper standard. In order to
afford speakers the proper level of protection, their speech should be analyzed under the
appropriate test. This is accomplished through an analysis of the speech in question itself before
it is applied to a specific test.
Second, when courts do engage in speech classification, it is not a fluid task. Courts are
often unsure of how to proceed, and often times blend a true threats analysis with a Brandenburg
analysis in an attempt to obtain a more just result. Other times, courts use factors such as context

See id (quoting Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027 (publicly threatening speech must be so “unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate, and specific” to the person threatened that it conveys a “gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution.”)
137 See id. at 431.
138 See id.
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and the public nature of the speech in varying ways and at varying times during the analysis,
creating inconsistent approaches among courts in approaching these situations.
As such, in this section, I propose a new test for analyzing ambiguously threatening speech
by examining the countervailing approaches in the case law, as discussed in Part III. The goal of
this new test is to create a synthesized, consistent test for approaching cases involving ambiguo us
speech that ensures a proper level of Constitutional protection by determining which speech test
(“true threats” or Brandenburg) is appropriate in each case.
The test will consist of two parts. The first part is a two-factor test that examines the speech
itself, based on an analysis of the general framework developed through case law and in light of
the doctrinal justifications identified in Part I. Specifically, this two-factor test will first examine
the target of the speech, and then examine the speech’s mode of communication, to determine
whether the speech should be classified as “threatening” or “advocacy.”
The second part is the implementation of either the reasonable objective person test, for
speech classified as “threatening,” or a Brandenburg analysis, for speech deemed “advocacy.”
Following this illustration, I will re-examine Turner in light of the new test I articulate.
To preface, this test need not be implemented whenever a court is tasked with determining
whether speech in a given case is proscribable or not. Rather, this test becomes effective when a
court is confronted with threatening speech that is difficult to characterize. Failure to monitor the
lines between threatening speech and potential advocacy violates basic tenants of First
Amendment case law in that it may afford less protection to speech that deserves more, or vice versa. “We must make an initial determination of the category of speech under which our analysis
lies because the Constitutional question turns on the source of the [] fear.”139 To presuppose that
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the issue at hand is a threat warranting an application of the “true threats” test neglects the premise
that threats and incitement warrant different Constitutional protections, and those afforded to
advocacy and incitement will have less force if all speech is initially categorized as a threat. 140
A. Two-Factor Test
Although a clear test for categorizing speech has never been explicitly created, case law
over the years has relied on several principles for distinguishing threats from protective advocacy,
as outlined in Part III. This two-factor test will examine and synthesize these approaches into two
primary inquiries. The first factor will inquire into the “target” of the speech. This factor will first
address why uncovering the “target” of the speech is imperative to classifying speech. Next, this
factor examines how the “target” of the speech is uncovered, and how much weight should be
afforded to the context of the speech.
The second factor will inquire into the “mode of communication.” This second factor will
examine how and/or when the classification of speech should differ depending on whether the
speech is publicly communicated.

Once each factor has been analyzed, the speech will be

classified as either “threatening” or “advocacy” and will be subject to the appropriate test for
determining whether the law proscribes the speech.
i.

The Target of the Speech

This first factor inquires into the “target” of the speech. However, in order to uncover the
target of the speech, it is imperative to understand why uncovering the target of the speech is
essential to classifying speech. That understanding revolves around one of the most basic human
emotions implicated with threatening speech – fear.
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The sin qua non of a threat is fear. When a speaker wishes to communicate a threat to
another person, he uses fear as his tool. However, several courts and judges have held that fear
alone is not, and cannot, be enough to create a threat. In his Planned Parenthood dissent, Judge
Kozinski addressed this concern through the use of examples. For example, when a doctor
informs a patient that he has cancer, the patient will surely be placed in a state of fear. 141
Similarly, when a person informs a third party that the third party is in danger, that speech is not
a threat, even though the third party will surely be placed in a fearful state. 142 It follows then that
where a protestor tells the objects of protest that they are in danger and further indicates political
support for the violent third parties, he has also not made a threat, but merely advocated violence
or harm that he will not control.143
These courts that follow Judge Kozinski’s rationale rely on the element of control to
separate such speech from speech that is a “true threat.” They hold that the court must be sure
that the speaker herself or one under her control has placed the listener in fear.144 Without
evidence of control, resulting punishment is not aimed at the threat, but rather at the effect of the
fear itself, a rather speech-chilling predicament.
However, reliance on the element of control is misguided. When a speaker is charged with
making a threat or inciting unlawful conduct, their guilt or culpability does not depend on the
causal chain between the speech and any harm that results from the speech, because we do not
require harm to result from the speech. Instead, when we punish someone for their threat, we are
punishing them for the fear that they place their victim in. And when we punish a speaker for
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incitement of unlawful conduct, although the victim may feel “fear,” we punish the speaker for the
risk of harm that is created towards the victim.
The distinction between threatening speech and advocacy/potential incitement of unlawful
conduct turns on the fear that is involved.145 When someone informs another that they are going
to kill or harm him or her, it engenders a greater level of fear in that person than if the speaker had
encouraged others to kill or harm that person. They know that you have the desire and willpo wer
to kill or harm them, and that increases the level of fear. But when a speaker encourages others to
kill or harm someone, that person does not know whether the listeners will carry through on the
speaker’s wishes. Although they may be afraid, there is not the same level of “fear” implicated as
if they had been the target of the speech, because fear alone is not the goal of the inciter; instead,
the inciter targets third-parties to will them to action and create an increased risk of harm.
Thus, in order to properly classify speech, we must uncover the target of the speech. With
threatening speech, the speaker’s target is also the object of her speech. For example, if a
disgruntled citizen tells a politician, “If you run for office I will kill you,” the politician is the
object of the speech, and since the speech is directed only at the politician, he constitutes the target
as well. When the object of the speech is also the target, the level of fear that is generated by the
speech is greater, and the speech is rightly classified as “threatening.”
On the contrary, advocacy is not aimed at the object of the speaker’s message, but at third
parties, who may or may not be known to the speaker. It is through these third parties that the
speaker can accomplish his goal. To change the scenario of the above example, if a disgruntled
politician says, “If that candidate runs for office, he should be killed,” the object of the speech
remains the politician, as in the prior example. However, the target of such speech is now unclear.

145 The following analysis came to fruition through numerous discussions with Professor Thomas Healy.
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It would seem that such speech is targeted not at the politician, but at third parties, whom the
speaker wishes to act on his behalf. The requisite level of fear is not generated by this speech on
behalf of the speaker to the object – instead, a risk of harm is created, because the object of the
speech does not know whether or not the third parties will act on the speaker’s wishes.
a. Facial Examination
In order to uncover the target of the speech, a facial analysis of the language in question
will be implemented. The goal will be identifying the target of the speech through two
examinations of the speech in question: examining the “voice” of the speech; and examining
whether or the not speech consists of a “prediction” or “exhortation.”
The first examination is the “voice” of the speech in question. Speech in the “active” voice
connotes that the speaker or speakers mean to carry out the speech in question. For example, “I
will kill you”146 connotes that “you,” the listener, is the target. On the other hand, speech in the
“passive” voice, for example, “You should be killed,”147 connotes a passiveness on the part of the
speaker, who, though he may desire death or injury to befall the listener, does not necessarily
threaten harm from himself.

Instead, it is ambiguous as to the target of speech, and such

encouragements or inducements to others should be analyzed as advocacy of unlawful conduct as
opposed to threats.
The second examination is whether the speech is an “exhortation” or “prediction.”

In

essence, an “exhortation” is the direction of speech to third parties, even though the subject of the
speech is a different person. For example, in the case of U.S. v. Bagdarasian, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was confronted with several comments posted to a popular blog. In
reference to President Obama’s election, the user posted a comment, stating, “[Sh]oot the nig” to
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the blog.148 By examining the speech facially, the court determined that the speech in question
was not a threat, because the speech was directed at third parties, though President Obama
remained the subject.149 “’[S]hoot the nig’ is…an imperative intended to encourage others to take
violent action, if not simply an expression of rage or frustration. ”150 Though sure not to win the
sympathy of many, the defendant’s speech was directed at third parties, for whom his wish may
be acted upon, and thus subject to a Brandenburg analysis.151
A trickier proposition is that of the “prediction.” Both “exhortations” and “predictio ns ”
are speech typically associated with advocacy of unlawful conduct and incitement. To return to
U.S. v. Bagdarasian, the speaker in that case also predicted that President Obama would be
assassinated due to his political positions. Nevertheless, the court construed the speaker’s message
not as a threat on behalf of Bagdarasian, but as a prediction. “The ‘Obama fk the niggar’ statement
is a prediction that Obama ‘will have a 50 cal in the head soon.’152 It conveys no explicit or implic it
threat on the part of Bagdasarian that he himself will kill or injure Obama.” Predictions may have
a subject, but they do not specify a target; like passive speech, they are ambiguous as to the target
of the speech, and do not generate the level of fear that speech targeted at the object does.
Where predictions may get complicated is when a conditionality factor is introduced into
the mix. In its simplest form, a conditional statement states that, “If you do not do X, you will be
killed.” In U.S. v. Hoffman, the court dealt with a similar situation. The speaker in question sent
a letter to then President Ronald Reagen, stating, “Ronnie, Listen Chump! Resign or You'll Get
Your Brains Blown Out.”153 Though the majority properly analyzed the speech as a threat, they
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did not analyze the speech, but rather determined that the speech, combined with the resulting
context, created a true threat.
The dissent, penned by Senior District Judge Will, strongly opposed the condemnation of
Hoffman’s speech as a true threat. To Judge Will, based on an examination of the speech itself,
Hoffman’s speech was a passive prediction devoid of any intent on the writer’s part to kill the
president, and should have been analyzed under the Brandenburg standard as opposed to the true
threats test.154 Though I would agree with Judge Will’s method of first analyzing the speech
facially to determine the target of the speech, I disagree with his result. First, unlike the prediction
in U.S. v. Bagdarasian, the conditionality of the statement conveys to the listener that the speaker
will kill or injure the President. The message is directed to the President, implying that if the
President does not comply with his demands, he will kill him. Second, as noted in Section I, one
of the key doctrinal distinctions between threats and advocacy is the purpose of the speech.
Whereas advocacy seeks to persuade third parties to act in violation of the law, threats attempt to
force the listener to act or not act against his own volition. Identifying and targeting the listener
accomplishes this goal. With a conditional statement, the goal is clear – it is not just mere
encouragement or a passive prediction of death or injury, but a veiled attempt to force the listener
to act or not act. Threats are ways of doing things, as opposed to saying things.

Conditiona l

statements are an example of “ways of doing things,” and unlike predictions, they should be
analyzed under a true threats analysis.
It will not always be the case that speech can be readily examined on its face. As noted in
Turner, threats are often not “conveyed with the grammatical precision of an Oxford don.”155

See id. at 719-21 (Will, J. dissenting) (“Hoffman’s statement is expressly conditioned on an event outside his
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However, judges need not also approach these issues with the precision of an English professor.
Instead, an intuitive characterization of the speech in question will aid in the facial examination of
ambiguous speech to ensure that a proper level of protection is afforded to the speech. Justice
Hatchett of the Florida Supreme Court illustrated an example of this approach:
Indeed, the question must be asked: What is the proper characterization, for
purposes of constitutional analysis, of the words "two, four, six, eight, who shall
we assassinate?," followed by one or more names of specific persons? Comparing
that utterance to some slightly reconfigured variations thereof, does it not resemble
"X should be assassinated" more closely than "We are going to assassinate X"? The
former statement, of course, constitutes advocacy of the commission of a crime,
and would presumably be analyzed pursuant to Brandenburg. 156
Such an approach allows for the aforementioned analysis to proceed, even though the language is
not completely clear.
b. Context
In dismissing a facial examination of the speech in question, many courts, like the majority
in Turner, rely on the proposition that "[r]igid adherence to the literal meaning of a communica tio n
without regard to its reasonable connotations...would render the statute powerless against the
ingenuity of threateners who can instill in the victim's mind as clear an apprehension of impending
injury by an implied menace as by a literal threat.”157 That is, they believe that context should be
a key factor in determining whether speech is a threat or advocacy because it reveals the speakers
actual message.

This proposition is true and imperative to any true threats analysis.

Often,

threatening speech is conveyed implicitly; courts must be cogniza nt of the fact that while speech
may not facially appear threatening, when one accounts for the context of the message, the curtain
is pulled back to reveal the true message. 158
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However, when making the initial determination of whether to analyze speech as a threat
or as incitement, greater weight should be given to the characterization of the speech in question,
as opposed to its context, because the characterization of the speech lends directly to determining
the target of the speech. When classifying speech the use of context should be reined in. The
purpose of this section is to uncover the target of the speech based on a facial analysis – it is not
to determine whether the speech itself is a proscribed threat. Once classified, context will then be
taken into account under the appropriate test. At this stage, context should be limited to proffering
evidence that the true target is not third parties, but the listener.
Use of additional context at this stage would distract from properly uncovering the target
of the speech and, in turn, classifying the speech. Returning to the Planned Parenthood decision
briefly, and facially examining the speech without the shadow of context, a different message is
perhaps revealed than the one decided by the court. The “WANTED” posters and Nuremburg
Files alone do not convey the message that these doctors are being targeted, and are in danger of
harm from the speakers.159 Rather, it appears more likely that the posters and website appear to
create a risk of harm to those physicians by putting them in the spotlight, severely criticizing them,
and providing information that enhanced the likelihood that a reader - someone other than the
speaker - would be able to identify, locate, and harm them. 160 That situation corresponds more
closely with the danger associated with advocacy of violence than that associated with threats of
violence, and therefore the speech in question appears to be the kind of speech whose suppression
is to be limited by the Brandenburg test.161
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“When our law punishes words, we must examine the surrounding circumstances to
discern the significance of those words' utterance, but must not distort or embellish their plain
meaning so that the law may reach them.”162 It is true that threats will engender a greater amount
of fear in a listener than advocacy of force, which creates an increased risk of harm. However, it
could also be said that most advocacy has attached to it a tinge of menace, likely to put the listener
in some state of fear. Reliance on contextual analyses at this point can distort the distinctio n
between threatening speech and advocacy of force.

As such, in order to properly classify

threatening speech and ensure a proper level of protection is afforded to the speaker, the use of
context at this stage of the analysis should be restricted.
ii. The Mode of Communication
The second factor examines the mode of communication that encapsulates the speech.
Specifically, this factor is concerned with the issue of whether or not (or more specifically, when)
speech should be subject to a different analysis because it is conveyed privately as opposed to
publicly, and vice versa. Though analyses over the private/public nature of speech differ, the mode
of communication is a factor generally raised at some point when courts are tackling cases
involving more ambiguous speech. Though some courts, such as the majority in Turner, disagree,
the mode of communication implicated is an essential factor that should hold great weight in these
analyses, for two reasons: first, distinguishing between speech conveyed privately as opposed to
publically helps to resolve ambiguities that remain following the analysis of the target of the speech
(factor 1), by illuminating the speaker’s true intentions; and second, privately communicated
speech is more likely to generate the level of fear associated with true threats, as opposed to
publicly communicated speech.
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a. Privately Communicated Speech
Courts traditionally are more inclined to subject privately communicated speech to a true
threats analysis, as opposed to publicly communicated speech. 163 I agree with this analysis, and
believe it should apply to all forms of threatening speech – explicit threats, implicit threats,
purported advocacy, and ambiguous speech, because when a speaker communicates his message
privately, the true intentions behind the speech may come to light.
As to explicitly threatening language, the intentions that are revealed are somewhat obvious
– the choice of private communication is only further evidence of the speaker’s desire to
communicate a threat to a specific target.

Where privately communicated speech is more

important to classifying ambiguous language is when the court is faced with speech involving
implicit threats, ambiguous language, and purported advocacy.
With implicit threats, ambiguous language, and purported advocacy, it is a trickier
situation. If X receives a communication that says "death to X," X will undoubtedly feel threatened
by it.164 But isn't that statement properly viewed as advocacy of X's death, rather than as a threat
to kill him?165 Should the fact that the "advocacy" is communicated to the "target" change the
analysis?166 Some commentators posit that such “advocacy” should not always be altered based
on the private nature in which the speech is conveyed. 167 Oftentimes such communications will
still be guised in serious political discussions that may warrant retention of some First Amendme nt
protection.

163 See id. (“‘Public speeches advocating violence’ [are allowed] substantially more leeway under the First

Amendment than ‘privately communicated threats.’”) (internal citation omitted).
164 See Rohr, supra note 91 at 51.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 90 (“I would eschew any attempt to distinguish between "public" and "private" speech.”).
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However, when a speaker privately communicates an ambiguous message to a target, the
purposes behind the speech are elucidated and greater weight is added both to the message and to
its effects. Furthermore, although the language itself my be directed at third parties, when such
language is communicated directly to the target there is effectively no “advocacy.” The goal of
advocacy is to sway the minds of third parties to act. If such “advocacy” is not presented to those
third parties, but rather directly to the target, such speech is not in fact advocacy, but perhaps a
clever attempt at a veiled threat. Accordingly, such speech should be properly analyzed as a true
threat as opposed to advocacy. This rationale also solves the issue touched on at the end of factor
1. Although non-explicitly threatening language operates in a sort of “twilight zone,” as it is
generally unclear as to whether the speaker is directing his speech at the target, or whether the
speech is a prediction or exhortation to others, if such speech is privately communicated to the
target it will be analyzed as a true threat.
Not only does private communication elucidate the intentions of the speaker, but it also
engenders a greater amount of fear in the listener, as opposed to publicly communicated speech.
When a message is communicated to a listener that contains overtones of or direct references to
violence, that listener is going to be put into a greater level of fear than if that message had been
communicated publicly or to another person. There is no general risk of harm present that we
typically see in advocacy of unlawful conduct cases – these messages put the listener in a state of
fear sufficient to warrant a true threats analysis as to whether they are punishable or not.
b. Publicly Communicated Speech
Publicly communicated speech, on the other hand, consists of speech conveyed through a
public medium or in a public forum. The direct connection between the speaker, the speech, and
the target is broken by the message being broadcast beyond just the object of the speech.
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Traditionally, substantial deference is afforded to public speech.168 Public speech, in the attempt
to sway the opinions of others, typically implicates core First Amendment principles, which
command the utmost protection afforded by the First Amendment. 169
More importantly, for purposes of this test, is the diffusion of speech by way of the public
medium or forum. Public speech, though it may only concern one person, is more likely to be
directed not just at one person, but at many, in an effort to rally others of like mind to join the
cause or act on the beliefs of the speaker. Similar to the way that privately communicated speech
can illuminate the true intentions of the speaker, publicly communicated speech acts in a similar
way – it perhaps reveals that the speaker intends to direct his speech at third parties in an effort to
rally them behind the speaker’s message.
Furthermore, unlike privately communicated speech, the level of fear that is generated by
public speech is generally not as severe as that associated with a privately communicated message.
Surely the listener may be placed in some state of fear – however, the primary result of this speech
is not a level of fear associated with true threats, but instead, a risk of harm similar to advocacy of
force. By spreading their message by way of a public medium or forum, speakers are able to
access countless third parties who may follow through on their calls to action. This creates an
increased risk of harm typically associated with advocacy of force, and such speech should be
accordingly analyzed under Brandenburg.
But does that mean that public speech can never be analyzed as a true threat? It does not;
to do so would allow a rather large loophole for clever individuals to possibly threaten while under
the guise of incitement. This entails using publicly communicated speech as a shield – devious

See Claiborne, 102 S. Ct. at 3433 (“Since respondents would impose liability on the basis of a public address —
which predominantly contained highly charged political rhetoric lying at the core of the First Amendment—we
approach this suggested basis of liability with extreme care.")
169 See id.
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threat-makers could threaten others through a public forum or medium, such as the Internet, and
then hide behind Brandenburg’s protection.
Furthermore, unlike private communications, speakers can still use public speech to
accomplish their objectives. As mentioned earlier, when a speaker communicates a message to
someone privately, it would be contradictory to claim that such speech is advocacy. The message
is targeted at the listener alone; without third parties to accomplish the speaker’s objective, there
can be no advocacy of force. With public communications—though it is more likely that speech
is directed at third parties because of the numbers of listeners and the types of messages involve d—
that does not necessarily need to be the case. Unlike private communications, speakers can still
target the subject of their message through public communications, not just third parties.
Additionally, public mediums have dramatically changed in recent years, notably with the
advent of the Internet and the immediate accessibility and ease with which a person can publicly
transmit information and messages through it. As seen above in both Planned Parenthood and
Turner, the Internet provides its users with the ability to access and communicate a potentially
threatening message to millions of people at the click of a mouse. This has opened up a new
avenue for speakers to threaten targets, while also providing an effective escape measure for
avoiding liability.
Nevertheless, this issue remains one of contention for many courts because of the history
of strong deference courts give to public speech. Cases such as U.S. v. Kelner and Claiborne look
to public speech and its ties to quintessential First Amendment values and principles and require
clear evidence of a threat in order to negate the protections afforded to public speech. However,
in the past, public communication was more easily defined – public speeches, rallies, and protests
that contained a large, but limited, audience, and where the speech was generally portrayed against
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a backdrop of political unrest. Courts were quick to afford this speech the utmost protection
because it underscores the basic principles of American freedom – the ability to strongly and
effectively speak out against the government and those who are impeding on your rights.
In recognition of these competing issues, this factor will attempt to strike a balance between
the two. When threatening public speech is specifically targeted at an individual, there should be
no deference given to the public nature of the speech, and the speech should be analyzed as a threat
as opposed to advocacy or incitement. However, it is not enough that the speech be directed at a
target in accordance with factor 1. The speech not only may not consist of a prediction or
exhortation to others, but it must be specifically directed at the target. This includes not only
directing the message at the target, but the message must be specific in identifying the target. In
these cases, when a listener is specifically targeted by a direct communication or through
identification, the level of fear associated with this speech rises to a level where a “true threats”
analysis should apply, regardless of the presence of an increased risk of harm. The specific
targeting of the listener creates a fear in the listener that outweighs any deference to the public
forum or medium, warranting a “true threats” analysis. If the specificity requirement is not met,
such speech should otherwise be analyzed as advocacy of unlawful conduct under Brandenburg.
Iterations of this requirement have previously sprung up in case law, albeit not for speech
classification purposes. The Kelner court required a showing of “specificity” in order for public
speech to be proscribed. Likewise, the majority in Planned Parenthood relied on the fact that,
though public speech was implicated, the doctors were “personally targeted,” and the court in
NAACP noted that Evers did not specifically identify any of the people he was admonishing.
Compared to courts like the majority in Turner, which outright rejected deference to public speech
in their analyses, and courts such as NAACP and the Turner dissent, that require extreme deference,
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this factor finds a middle ground.

Requiring an additional showing of specificity toes the line

between deference to public speech and recognition of the changing times, technologies, and
tendencies of speakers in order to more effectively distinguish between threats and advocacy of
unlawful conduct.
iii. Implementation

of either objective “reasonable person” true threats test or

Brandenburg analysis
In sum, the examination will look to two factors: first, whether the speech is directed at a
specific target, or directed at third parties over whom the speaker does not have control; and finally,
whether the speech was a public or private communication.

In the end, the speech may be

classified as either a threat or advocacy, and appropriately analyzed. However, the analysis of the
speech is not done yet. Upon completion of the aforementioned factor test, the court will be
presented with a categorized message they must now further analyze under either the true threats
test or the Brandenburg analysis, pending the conclusion of the factor test, to determine whether
law protects such speech.
Should the speech be classified as “advocacy of unlawful conduct” it will be subject to a
Brandenburg analysis to determine whether or not it is proscribable advocacy of unlawful conduct.
We will know at this point that the speech is directed at others. The prominent factors that remain
to be evaluated will be the “imminence” of the speech in question, as well as the context
surrounding the speech.
Should the speech be classified as “threatening,” a true threats analysis will follow. As
mentioned in Section I, although the objective-listener test is the most popular, there remain
several fringe tests used by courts and circuits around the country. The important factor to be
taken into consideration, no matter what test is implemented, will be an analysis of the content of
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the speech, to determine whether such speech is in fact threatening. At this point, a more open
examination into the context surrounding the speech will take place. Context will play a crucial
role in determining whether the speech in question is the expression of ideas or a serious threat of
violence towards the target.
B. Re-examining U.S. v. Turner
As touched on earlier, U.S. v. Turner certainly did not present an easy case for the court to
navigate. Turner’s nebulous, aggressive language, while difficult to swallow, did not present as
cut-and-dry of a case as one might suspect on first glance. Add to that the context of previous blog
posts tainted with violent imagery and language, and his use of an Internet blog to convey his
message, and U.S. v. Turner presents an optimal case for this new test. As mentioned previously,
this test need not always be implemented; however, when confronted with a complicated factual
scenario such as the one seen in Turner, in order to protect the Constitutional rights of speakers
and guard First Amendment doctrine, a more exacting analysis, such as the one proposed, should
commence.
i.

Target

The starting point is a facial examination of Turner’s speech. Although Turner posted a
lengthy blog condemning the decision reached by the three judges in question, Turner’s allegedly
threatening speech presents itself in three sentences: First, Turner proclaims that“[t]hese Judges
deserve to be killed.170 Their blood will replenish the tree of liberty. ”171 Second, after referring to
the murder of Judge Lefkow’s husband and mother at the hands of Matthew Hale, he writes, “These
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See U.S. v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2013)
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Judges deserve to be made such an example of as to send a message to the entire judiciary: Obey
the Constitution or die.”172
Throughout his blog, Turner calls for the deaths of these three judges. It is quite obvious
that he wishes for these judges to be killed. It is very likely that this speech was intended to, and
did in fact, strike fear into the minds of the judges implicated. However, though the judges are the
objects of his disdain, his speech seems to be not directed at these judges, but at third parties.
“These Judges deserve to be killed.”173 “These Judges deserve to made such an example of….”174
Turner’s comments, all made in the passive voice, are more appropriately classified as exhortatio ns
to third parties - third parties willing and able to act on the violence he so wishes upon Judges
Easterbrook, Posner, and Bauer.
The majority primarily relied on the “seriousness” of Turner’s statements and actions, as
well as previous comments made by Turner to supply a violent context, in pronouncing Turner’s
statements as “true threats.”175 Though the “seriousness” of the speech is not a relevant inquiry at
this stage in the analysis, a contextual analysis remains proper. However, unlike the contextual
analysis conducted by the majority in Turner, under this test it will be more restricted. Applicable
context at this point will serve only to assist in uncovering the true target of the speech.
Previous blog posts provide that context, “from which a reader might infer Turner’s
intentions in writing the post.”176 Turner’s posts cover various topics and individuals, including a
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Connecticut legislator and the “major players behind the financial meltdown.”177 Turner wrote, "I
intend to incite revenge…Vicious,

brutal, savage, revenge with malice aforethought. "

178

Furthermore, Turner again referenced the tragedy that befell Judge Lefkow, stating, “While I can't
legally undertake killing, I may—just MAY—be able to say enough of the right things, to enough
of the right people, to make it happen: People who have lost everything on account of you,” and,
“Judge Lefkow made a ruling in court that I opined made her "worthy of death. After I said that,
someone went out and murdered her husband and mother inside the Judges Chicago house.”179
Turner’s comments are certainly distasteful and invite scorn – however, these contextual
comments aid the theory that Turner’s intentions were not to threaten the judges, but rather to
incite third parties to commit violence.
ii.

Mode of Communication

Being that his speech was conveyed through the Internet, a public medium, there is no issue
as to the private/public communications distinction. Because of the circumstances of this case,
this section does not require much in the way of analysis. Turner’s speech was classified under
factor 1 as being targeted at third parties. Additionally, the public nature of the speech, in that it
is aimed at the public at large and not targeted at an individual, resolves any potential ambiguities
regarding factor 1. Under this examination, Turner’s speech is best classified as advocacy of
unlawful conduct and subject to a Brandenburg analysis to determine its protection.
iii.

“True threat” or Brandenburg test

Though a Brandenburg analysis is appropriate, the circumstances of this case do not
warrant one. Turner was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) for "threaten[ing] to assault and murder
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three United States judges with the intent to impede, intimidate, and interfere with such judges
while engaged in the performance of official duties and with intent to retaliate against such judges
on account of the performance of official duties….”180 Save for one decision out of the Fourth
Circuit (which classified its own reasoning as dicta),181 no circuit has held that the word “threaten”
under § 876 includes punishment for incitement of illegal activity. 182 Though Turner’s speech
does not constitute a threat, it may in fact be unprotected under an incitement statute—as both the
district court and the Turner dissent alluded to.183 Nevertheless, that is not the case here. Thus,
the author agrees with the Turner dissent that Turner’s conviction should be vacated.
V – Conclusion
U.S. v. Turner constitutes a missed opportunity. The court had an opportunity to truly
tackle the confusing conflux of true threats and incitement. Instead, we received a blurred
distinction between the two, further muddying an already ambiguous and confusing field of law.
In response, this Comment has attempted to craft a synthesized analysis for the courts to
implement when they are confronted with ambiguous speech that treads the line between threats
and advocacy/incitement. The distinction is an essential one; improper application of the “true
threats” test over Brandenburg, or vice versa, blurs the line between the two doctrines, possibly
diminishing the force of the respective doctrine and assigning an improper level of Constitutional
protection to the defendant’s case. Courts should take heed of this common pitfall and apply a
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two-step analysis, such as the one proffered in this Comment, to ensure the protection of not only
these crucial doctrines, but the First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens.
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